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Abstract 
In OECD countries, redistribution policies are provided for young and old generations. 
Taxation of many kinds to finance the redistribution policy exists, just as redistribution 
policies of many kinds exist. Our paper sets a model with heterogeneous labor 
productivity for households and sectors of two types: a skilled sector and an unskilled 
sector. The model elucidates how the government should collect tax revenue for 
redistribution policies. Results show that the labor income tax can always shrink income 
inequality. However, the consumption tax increases wage inequality between skilled and 
unskilled sector. It is not always sufficient to shrink income inequality after 
redistribution, even if skilled workers increase. A corporate tax shrinks income 
inequality if intertemporal consumption is substitutive. Results show that the 
redistribution policy effects depend on how the government collects tax revenue. 
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1. Introduction 
Our paper presents an examination of how a government should collect tax revenues to 
provide a redistribution policy to shrink income inequality. Taxation of many kinds is 
used to support redistribution policies: labor income taxation, consumption taxation, 
corporate tax, capital income tax, and so on. Similarly, redistribution policies of many 
kinds exist: pensions are provided for older people; income transfers are made according 
to need or means testing; etc. 
The government should provide a redistribution policy to reduce income inequality. 
However, the government should collect tax revenue to provide redistribution. The 
explanation provided in this paper shows that differences in taxation bring about 
different effects on income growth and income inequality and affect the manner in which 
the government should finance tax revenue. 
A redistribution policy is necessary to shrink income inequality. In Japan, the Gini 
coefficient is at a constant level in spite of its aging society with fewer children. Although 
aging can magnify income inequality, the Gini coefficient is kept at a constant level 
thanks to redistribution policy. 
In an aging society with fewer children, we must consider intergenerational 
inequality. Given fewer people of younger generations, the tax burden per young person 
continues to increase and intergenerational inequality expands. Consequently, 
redistribution policies become unsustainable. Therefore, a consumption tax levied for all 
generations must be considered in aging societies such as those existing in many OECD 
countries. Corporate tax rates are expected to decrease worldwide because governments 
are striving to make national firms competitive. 
Our paper presents the following results. A redistribution policy financed by labor 
income tax can always shrink income inequality: output (gross domestic product) does 
not change. Although the consumption tax and the corporate tax increase the output 
(GDP), the income inequality might be exacerbated, depending on the parametric 
condition. Considering social welfare, labor income taxation should be used as a 
redistribution policy, not a consumption tax or capital income tax. 
As described by the OECD (2014a), the consumption tax share reached 31% of 
average tax revenue as a percentage of total taxation in OECD countries at 2012. 
Especially, the consumption tax share to total tax revenue continues increasing in an 
aging society. However, the corporate income tax share is nearly constant. The corporate 
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tax rate is tending to decrease worldwide.1 In spite of the decreased incorporate tax rate, 
the corporate tax share does not decrease. We can regard the reason as low corporate 
taxes increasing firm profits. Consequently, the tax revenue increases. 
Many governments worldwide aim to decrease income inequality. However, OECD 
(2014b, 2014c) shows the OECD average Gini coefficient raised from 0.29 in the 1980s to 
0.32 at 2011–2012. Figure 1 shows the Gini coefficient and poverty rate in OECD 
countries. 
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Fig. 1 Income Inequality in OECD Countries (data: OECD (2014b))2. 
 
Some means of taxation must exist. Consumption taxes, which are levied on the sale 
of goods and services, are widely used in OECD countries. The consumption tax rates in 
EU countries are higher than in other countries. As shown by Carroll and Viard (2012), 
the consumption tax presents no disincentive for working, compared with labor income 
taxation.3 Moreover, consumption is observable and governments can find the ability to 
pay the tax and can levy a tax burden appropriately in terms of equality. The optimal 
consumption tax was examined first by Ramsey (1927), who presents the Ramsey rule 
that the consumption tax must be levied based on the elasticity of consumption goods. 
                                                  
1 For instance, the corporate income tax in Japan reached 43.3% in the past. However, the corporate 
tax in Japan in recent years is 25.5% (The tax rate includes only the national tax. data: Ministry of 
Finance Japan). 
2 Data are for 2010. 
3  The consumption tax can have a distortive effect on labor and leisure decisions because the 
consumption tax decreases the real wage rate, thereby reducing consumption. 
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The Ramsey rule is extended by Corlett and Hague (1953), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a, 
1971b), and others.4 Bargain and Donni (2012) consider the targets for individuals 
within households and derive the optimal indirect taxation rule. 
As surveyed by Chari and Kehoe (1999), Kocherlakota (2010), and others, Chamley 
(1986) and Judd (1985) derive that an optimal capital income tax rate is zero. These 
results show that the taxation must not be levied for accumulation factors. Therefore, if 
the labor income is determined by the accumulation factor such as human capital, then 
the labor income taxation must be zero to maximize social welfare as derived by Jones, 
Manuelli, and Rossi (1997). Chen and Lu (2013) report income taxation of two types and 
derive that the transition from capital income taxation to labor income taxation reduces 
welfare in the long run. Andorokovich, Daly and Naqib (1992) examine tax reform effects 
on welfare, which changes from a single tax instrument to hybrid with income taxation 
and the consumption tax. Correia (2010) derives that consumption with redistribution 
can raise the welfare level, depending on the distribution of wealth in households. The 
modified model brings about non-zero outcomes, derived by Correia (1996), who 
considers non-taxable factors of production. 
The income-growth-maximizing tax system is considered. Endogenous economic 
growth considering public investment is examined by Barro (1990), Futagami, Morita, 
and Shibata (1993) and by others. Typically, these studies set the model financed by 
income taxation for public investment to pull up the income growth rate. Watanabe, 
Miyake, and Yasuoka (2014) examine the case of a consumption tax. The consumption 
tax brings about higher income growth than the case of income taxation. Gaube (2005) 
derives optimal taxation in the public investment model with heterogeneous skilled labor. 
As shown in the field of optimal taxation problems specifically by Bertola, Foellmi and 
Zweimüller (2006), and Petrucci (2002), capital income taxation reduces capital 
accumulation and decreases income growth. 
Caselli (1999), Meckl and Zink (2004), and Miyake, Muro, Nakamura, and Yasuoka 
(2009) set a model with income inequality by which individual ability is distributed 
uniformly. Using the model, they examine the manner and degree to which a technology 
shock affects income inequality. Aronsson, Sjögren and Dalin (2009) set a redistribution 
model with individual ability type and derive non-zero capital income taxation. Werning 
(2007) also shows that individual skill differences have a role in determining the optimal 
tax rate for redistribution. Kim (1989) considers the heterogeneous labor supply and 
                                                  
4 Our paper refers to surveys of optimal taxation by Boadway (2012), Kocherlakota (2010), and Salanié 
(2011). 
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derives that the optimal taxation depends on the elasticities of labor supply. Boadway, 
Marchand, Pestieau and Racionero (2002) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2007) derive 
different tax burdens among different individual ability and preferences for leisure. As 
a redistribution form, an education subsidy can be considered. Shindo and Yanagihara 
(2011) derives that an education subsidy as a redistributive policy increases welfare. 
The remainder of this paper has the following structure. Section 2 sets the model 
with redistribution policy. Section 3 presents derivation of the equilibrium. We examine 
how the difference of taxation to provide the redistribution policy affects income 
inequality and an income level in section 4. Section 5 explains analyses of social welfare. 
The final section provides concluding and remarks. 
 
2. Model 
This model economy has three agents: households, firms, and government. The 
population size is set as unity. The population size does not grow over time. 
 
2.1 Household 
The individuals in the household live in two periods: a young period and old period. They 
consume in each period. cଵ୲ and cଶ୲ାଵ respectively denote consumption in the young 
period and that in the old period. On consumption in each period is levied a consumption 
tax at rate τୡ. 
Individuals in the young period supply their labor inelastically to gain labor income. 
wഥ୲ denotes the wage rate. The government collects tax revenue for labor income at tax 
rate	τ to provide for a lump-sum redistribution ௧ܶ. Defining 1 ൅ r୲ାଵ as an interest rate 
in t+1 period, the household lifetime budget constraint is shown as 
ሺ1 ൅ τୡሻcଵ୲ ൅
ሺ1 ൅ τୡሻcଶ୲ାଵ
1 ൅ r୲ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ τሻwഥ୲ ൅ ௧ܶ . (1) 
The household in our economy model cares about consumption in young and old 
periods. Our paper assumes the following log utility function shown below. 
u୲ ൌ cଵ୲
ଵି஘
1 െ θ ൅
1
1 ൅ ρ
cଶ୲ାଵଵି஘
1 െ θ ,  0 ൏ ߠ, 0 ൏ ߩ (2) 
If θ ൌ 1, then this function form becomes a log utility function: u୲ ൌ lncଵ୲ ൅ ଵଵା஡ lncଶ୲ାଵ. 
Also, ρ denotes the discount rate for the utility in the old period. 
The optimal allocations to maximize the utility function (2) subject to the budget 
constraint (1) are reduced as shown below. 
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cଵ୲ ൌ 11 ൅ τୡ
ሺ1 െ τሻwഥ୲ ൅ T୲
1 ൅ ሺ1 ൅ r୲ାଵሻ
ଵ
஘ିଵ
ሺ1 ൅ ρሻଵ஘
 
(3) 
cଶ୲ାଵ ൌ ൬1 ൅ r୲ାଵ1 ൅ ρ ൰
ଵ
஘ cଵ୲ (4) 
Defining the household saving as s୲ ൌ ሺ1 െ τሻwഥ୲ ൅ T୲ െ ሺ1 ൅ τୡሻcଵ୲, the saving is given by 
this equation and (3) as presented below. 
s୲ ൌ
ሺ1 െ τሻwഥ୲ ൅ T୲
1 ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ρሻ
ଵ
஘
ሺ1 ൅ r୲ାଵሻ
ଵ
஘ିଵ
 (5) 
If a log utility function is assumed, then the household saving is independent of an 
interest rate because θ ൌ 1. 
 
2.2 Firm 
Two sectors exist in the firm: one for a skilled sector and the other for an unskilled sector. 
Both sectors produce the same final goods. 
Our paper assumes heterogeneity of labor productivity. Labor productivity a  is 
distributed uniformly between 0 and aത ሺ0 ൏ aതሻ. In 2.2.3, young people decide the sector 
in which they work. 
 
2.2.1 Skilled Sector 
The final goods in the skilled sector are inputted by capital stock K୲ and labor N୲ using 
the following technology. 
Y୲ ൌ AK୲கN୲ଵିக, 0 ൏ ߝ ൏ 1, 0 ൏ ܣ (5) 
Y୲ denotes the final good produced by the skilled sector. We consider a profit maximizing 
problem. The profit function of the skilled sector is shown as 
π୲ ൌ ሺ1 െ τୖሻሺAK୲கN୲ଵିக െ w୲N୲ሻ െ ሺ1 ൅ r୲ሻK୲. (6) 
߬ோ denotes the corporate tax rate. w୲ represents the wage rate per effective labor. The 
corporate tax is levied on the profit: the firm revenue minus costs including the labor 
wage.5 This paper assumes that the capital stock is fully depreciated in a single period. 
With a perfectly competitive market, the profit maximization problem that the firms 
                                                  
5 This setting is that the capital cost is not allowed to subtract the cost in a corporate tax system. 
This setting is the same as that with Doi (2010). Doi (2010) considers that the rental cost is not the 
cost to subtract from corporate profit. Then, this corporate tax form affects the demand for labor and 
capital. We refer to another corporate tax form in the following section. 
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decides the demand of labor N୲ and capital stock K୲ to maximize the profit function (6) 
reduces the following wage rate and interest rate in the skilled sector. 
w୲ ൌ Aሺ1 െ ߝሻ K୲
க
N୲க (7) 
1 ൅ r୲ ൌ ሺ1 െ τୖሻAε K୲
கିଵ
N୲கିଵ (8) 
 
2.2.2  Unskilled Sector 
Unskilled sector inputs only labor and produces the final goods as the following 
technology. 
Z୲ ൌ BL୲, 0 ൏ ܤ (9) 
Therein, Z୲ denotes the final goods produced by the unskilled sector. Then, the wage 
rate in unskilled sector is defined as ݓ௧௖. Considering the profit function as ߨ௧ ൌ ܤܮ௧ െ
ݓ௧௖ܮ௧, the profit maximizing condition reduces as 
ݓ௖ ൌ ܤ . (10) 
The wage rate in the unskilled sector is constant over time. 
 
2.2.3 Labor Mobility 
Younger people supply labor either to the skilled sector or to the unskilled sector. If 
individuals work in the skilled sector, then they can obtain the wage	wഥ୲ ൌ aw୲, depending 
on their ability a. However, labor in the unskilled sector obtains the wage given by (10) 
in spite of their ability wഥ୲ ൌ B. Therefore, if they have little ability to work in the skilled 
sector, they had better work in the unskilled sector because of the higher wage rate. 
Based on the points presented above, individuals can hold aw୲ ൐ ܤ work at the 
skilled sector. Individuals having the ability to hold aw୲ ൏ ܤ work in the unskilled sector. 
Defining a୲∗	to	hold	the following equation, we have 
a୲∗w୲ ൌ B, (11) 
Considering uniform distribution of ability a, the share of working in skilled sector is 
ୟതିୟ∗
ୟത . The share of working in the unskilled sector is 
ୟ∗
ୟത . Then, the effective labor supply 
in the skilled sector is N୲ ൌ ׬ a ଵୟത da
ୟത
ୟ∗ . Therefore, the wage rate and the interest rate in 
the skilled sector are written as follows. 
w୲ ൌ Aሺ1 െ ߝሻ ቈaത
ଶ െ aത୲∗ଶ
2aത ቉
ିக
K୲க (12) 
1 ൅ r୲ ൌ ሺ1 െ τୖሻAεK୲கିଵ ቈaത
ଶ െ aത୲∗ଶ
2aത ቉
ଵିக
 (13) 
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2.3 Government 
The government collects tax revenues to provide the lump-sum redistribution T୲. The 
government budget constraint is shown below. 
T୲ ൌ τୡ ቈන c
ሺaሻଵ୲
aത da
ୟത
଴
൅ න cሺaሻଶ୲aത da
ୟത
଴
቉ ൅ τ ቈන aw୲aത da
ୟത
௔∗
൅ න Baത da
ୟ∗
଴
቉ ൅ τୖ൫AK୲஘N୲ଵି஘ െ w୲N୲൯ (14)
The first term of the right-hand-side shows the consumption tax revenue. 
cଵ୲ሺaሻ	and	cଶ୲ሺaሻ shows that the consumption level depends on ability a. The second term 
shows revenues from labor income. The final term shows corporate tax revenues. 
 
3. Equilibrium 
The equilibrium of this paper is specified as the capital stock dynamics. Considering 
household savings as s୲ ൌ ሺ1 െ τሻw୲ െ cଵ୲, the savings of skilled labor s୲ୱ and unskilled 
labor s୲୳ are given as 
s୲ୱ ൌ 1α୲ାଵ න ൫ሺ1 െ τሻaw୲ ൅ T୲൯
1
aത da
ୟത
ୟ౪∗
 (15) 
s୲୳ ൌ 1α୲ାଵ න ൫ሺ1 െ τሻB ൅ T୲൯
1
aത da
ୟ౪∗
଴
 (16) 
where 
α୲ାଵ ൌ 1 ൅ ሺଵା஡ሻ
భ
ಐ
ሺଵା୰౪శభሻ
భ
ಐషభ
 . (17) 
The dynamics of capital stock K୲ାଵ ൌ s୲ୱ ൅ s୲୳ is shown as follows. 
K୲ାଵ ൌ 1α୲ାଵ ቆ
1 െ τ
aത ቆ
ሺaതଶ െ a୲∗ଶሻw୲
2 ൅ Ba୲
∗ቇ ൅ T୲ቇ. (18) 
Given K୲, the share of working in skilled sector a୲∗ (11), the wage rate w୲ (12) and 
the interest rate 1 ൅ r୲ (13) are determined. K୲ାଵ is given as (18). Consumption cଵ୲, cଶ୲ 
are given respectively by (3) and (4). The redistribution benefit is given as (14). 
The local stability condition at the steady state is െ1 ൏ ୢ୏౪శభୢ୏౪ ൏ 1. 
ୢ୏౪శభ
ୢ୏౪  without a 
redistribution policy derived as6 
                                                  
6 See Appendix for a detailed proof. 
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dK୲ାଵ
dK୲ ൌ
1
αaത
ሺaതଶ െ a∗ଶሻεw
2K
1
1 ൅ 2εa∗aതଶ െ a∗ଶ
1 ൅ 1 െ θθ
α െ 1
α ሺ1 െ εሻቌ1 െ
1
aതଶ െ a∗ଶ
2εa∗ଶ ൅ 1
ቍ
,	 (19) 
where ஑ିଵ஑ >0 is positive because of (17). The steady state is defined by that endogenous 
variables x୲ is constant over time as x. With θ ൌ 1, which is a log utility function and 
the case in which that the saving is unaffected by the interest rate, we always obtain 
ୢ୏౪శభ
ୢ୏౪ ൐ 0. 
However, if θ ് 1, then the denominator of (19) might be negative. Defining θ∗ to hold 
1 ൅ ଵି஘஘
஑ିଵ
஑ ሺ1 െ εሻ ቆ1 െ
ଵ
౗ഥమష౗∗మ
మ಍౗∗మ ାଵ
ቇ ൌ 0 , we obtain ୢ୏౪శభୢ୏౪ ൏ 0  with θ ൐ θ
∗ , which is not 
substitutive between young and old consumption. 
 
4. Redistribution Policy 
In this section, we examine how the redistribution policy affects the capital stock, wage 
rate, the share of skilled labor, and other outcomes. Our paper presents consideration of 
taxation of labor income, corporate profits, and consumption, and presents an 
examination of whether different financing of revenues to provide a lump-sum 
redistribution brings about a substantial difference in income levels and income 
inequality, or not. 
 
4.1 Labor Income Tax 
In this subsection, we assess a redistribution policy with income taxation. Then, the 
government budget constraint is shown as 
T୲ ൌ தୟത ቀ
൫ୟതమିୟ౪∗మ൯୵౪
ଶ ൅ Ba୲∗ቁ . (20) 
Considering (18) and (20), the dynamics equation of K୲ is given as shown below. 
K୲ାଵ ൌ 1α୲ାଵ
1
aത ቆ
ሺaതଶ െ a୲∗ଶሻw୲
2 ൅ Ba୲
∗ቇ (21) 
This equation is equal to the dynamics equation without a redistribution policy and labor 
taxation. Therefore, the capital stock, wage rate in the skilled sector, interest rate, and 
the share of skilled labor in the steady state do not change. The inequality between the 
skilled sector and the unskilled sector, representing wage inequality, does not change 
10 
 
because  ୵
౩
୵౫ ൌ
୵
୆ is constant. 
We define ሺଵିதሻሺୟതିୟ
∗ሻ
ଶ ൅ T as the average income of skilled labor. Then, the income 
inequality between average skilled labor and average unskilled labor is given as Q ≡
ሺభషಜሻሺ౗ഥష౗∗ሻ
మ ା୘
ሺଵିதሻ୆ା୘ . This ratio is regarded as household disposable income inequality.  Because 
of income tax rate τ  and redistribution income T, this income inequality shrinks. 
Therefore, the following proposition is established. 
 
Proposition 1 
A redistribution policy with labor income taxation can reduce household disposable 
income inequality between skilled labor and unskilled labor without changing the capital 
stock, wage rate, interest rate or the share of skilled workers. 
 
We regard the result as intuitive. Regarding redistribution within the same 
generation, that is younger people, the aggregate saving does not change. Therefore, the 
level of capital stock does not change. This tax instrument can always shrink the income 
inequality. 
 
4.2 Consumption Tax 
This subsection presents an examination of how the redistribution policy financed by 
consumption tax affects inequality. 
If the government uses the consumption tax to provide a lump-sum redistribution, 
then the government budget constraint in the steady state is shown as 
T ൌ τୡ ቂ׬ ୡభሺୟሻୟത da
ୟത
଴ ൅ ׬ ୡమ
ሺୟሻ
ୟത da
ୟത
଴ ቃ . (22) 
From total differentiation of (22) by T  and τୡ  at the steady state in τୡ ൌ 0 , the 
following equation is obtained as 
dT
dτୡ ൌ φ, (23) 
where φ ൌ ׬ ୡభሺୟሻୟത da
ୟത
଴ ൅ ׬ ୡమ
ሺୟሻ
ୟത da
ୟത
଴ . Total differentiation of (18) by K, T at the steady state, 
we obtain ୢ୏ୢதౙ as 
ୢ୏
ୢ୘ ൌ
ୟത
൫౗ഥమష౗∗మ൯಍౭
మే
భ
భశ మ಍౗∗మ౗ഥమష౗∗మ
൬ ౚే౪ౚే౪శభିଵ൰
.. (24) 
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The sign of ୢ୏ୢ୘ is ambiguous. If the log utility function is assumed ሺθ ൌ 1ሻ, then this sign 
is always positive because the denominator is positive, given by the local stable condition. 
However, our paper assumes CRRA utility function which includes a log utility function 
as a more general utility function. Therefore, the sign of the denominator is positive or 
negative. If θ ൏ θ∗ , then we obtain ୢ୏ୢ୘>0. The redistribution policy increases the 
capital stock. An increase in capital stock increases the wage rate in skilled labor as 
follows because of (11) and (12):7 
dw
dK ൌ
εw
K
1
1 ൅ 2εa∗ଶaതଶ െ a∗ଶ
൐ 0. (25) 
An increase in capital stock increases the wage rate in skilled sector raises because of 
(24). Then the wage inequality  ୵
౩
୵౫ ൌ
୵
୆ is magnified by this redistribution policy. The 
share of skilled labor also increases. Total differentiation of (11) by a∗, w at the steady 
state reduces to the following. 
da∗
dw ൌ െ
a∗
w (26) 
The redistribution policy increases the wage rate and then pulls up the share of skilled 
labor. However, this redistribution policy raises labor income inequality among skilled 
laborers because of a decrease in a∗; i.e. the variance of ability a in skilled labor increases. 
  Now, we consider the household disposable income inequality. Then, the effects of the 
redistribution policy on the inequality are 
dQ
dT ൌ Q൮
aത
ሺaത ൅ a∗ሻw
dw
dT െ ቌ
1
B െ
1
aത ൅ a∗
2 w
ቍ൲. (27) 
If ୢ୵ୢ୘ ൏
ଵ
௔ത ቀ
ሺ௔തା௔∗ሻ௪
஻ െ 2ቁ, that is, if an increase in wage rate is small, then the household 
disposable income inequality between the two groups can be reduced by virtue of the 
redistribution policy. This condition holds for the case in which an increase in the wage 
rate is low level. 
  Considering (11) and (13), it is apparent that that the redistribution policy affects an 
interest rate in the steady state as shown below. 
                                                  
7 Total differentiation of (11) and (12) reduces to wda∗ ൅ a∗dw ൌ 0 and dw ൌ க୵୏ dK െ
ε ቀୟതమିୟ∗మଶୟത ቁ
ିଵ ቀെ ୟ∗ୟത ቁwda∗. Considering these two equations, we obtain (24). 
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dr
dT ൌ െ
ሺ1 െ εሻሺ1 ൅ rሻ
K ൮1 െ
1
aതଶ െ a∗ଶ
2εa∗ଶ ൅ 1
൲dKdT (28) 
As long as θ ൏ θ∗, an interest rate decreases because of the redistribution policy. Then, 
the following proposition is established. 
 
Proposition 2 
With θ ൏ θ∗, the redistribution policy financed by consumption tax raises the capital 
stock, wage rate, share of skilled labor, wage inequality between skilled labor and 
unskilled labor, and wage inequality among skilled laborers. It decreases the interest 
rate. If  ୢ୵ୢ୘ ൏
ଵ
ୟത ቀ
ሺୟതାୟ∗ሻ୵
୆ െ 2ቁ, then the household disposable income inequality between 
skilled labor and unskilled labor shrinks. 
 
In the case of θ ൏ θ∗, a redistribution policy raises the capital stock. This case might 
be a usual case. The consumption tax brings about income transfer from older people to 
younger people. Household income of young people increases and saving increases. Then, 
an increase in investment raises the capital stock. An increase in the capital stock raises 
productivity in skilled labor and the wage rate in skilled labor. Then, labor mobility to 
skilled labor increases. Because of these effects, income inequality does not shrink. 
If θ ൐ θ∗, then we obtain the opposite result. This case is complementary between 
consumption in the young period and that in the old period. ୢ୏ୢ୘<0 brings about an 
increase in the interest rate. Saving might decrease because an increase in the interest 
rate decreases the necessary saving to maintain the consumption level in the old period. 
The decrease in the capital stock decreases the wage rate for skilled labor. Actually, the 
share of skilled labor and ୢ୕ୢ୘ is always negative. Income inequality, regarded as wage 
inequality between skilled labor and unskilled labor, household disposable income 
inequality and wage inequality among skilled labor decreases. Then, the following 
proposition is established. 
 
Proposition 3 
With θ ൐ θ∗, the redistribution policy financed by consumption tax reduces the capital 
stock, wage rate, share of skilled labor, wage inequality between skilled labor and 
unskilled labor, wage inequality among skilled laborers, and the household disposable 
income between skilled labor and unskilled labor. It also increases the interest rate. 
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This result is unobtainable at the log utility function θ ൌ 1. The analyses presented 
herein demonstrate that the inter-temporal substitution of consumption should be 
considered in providing redistribution policy. 
 
4.3 Corporate Tax 
This section presents assessment of a redistribution policy with a corporate tax. Then, 
the government budget constraint is shown below. 
T ൌ τୖεAK୲கN୲ଵିக ൌ τୖሺ1 ൅ rሻK (29) 
From total differentiation of (29) by T and τୖ at the steady state in τୖ ൌ 0, the 
following equation is obtained. 
dT ൌ ሺ1 ൅ rሻKdτୖ (30) 
From total differentiation of (11), (12), (13), (17), (18) and considering (19) and (30), 
we obtain the sign of ୢ୏ୢ୘ as 
dK
dT ൌ
aത ൬1 െ 1 െ θθ
α െ 1
ሺ1 ൅ rሻ൰
ሺaതଶ െ a∗ଶሻεw
2K
1
1 ൅ 2εa∗ଶaതଶ െ a∗ଶ
൬ dK୲dK୲ାଵ െ 1൰
. (31) 
A corporate tax directly decreases capital income because of (8). This negative effect 
on capital income prevents investment in the capital stock. Defining θ∗∗ such that 1 ൌ
ଵି஘
஘
஑ିଵ
ሺଵା୰ሻ, if θ ൏ θ∗∗ ൏ θ∗, we obtain 
ୢ୏
ୢ୘ ൏ 0.8 Then, the wage rate of skilled labor and the 
share of skilled labor decrease because of (25) and (26). Considering (27), the 
redistribution policy brings about ୢ୕ୢ୘ ൏ 0, the household disposable income inequality 
shrinks. Totally differentiating (8), (11), (12), (13), (17), (18) and (29) by r, w, K, a∗, T, τୖ at 
τୖ ൌ 0, we obtain 
dr
dτୖ ൌ െ
ሺ1 െ εሻሺ1 ൅ rሻ
K ൮1 െ
1
aതଶ െ a∗ଶ
2εa∗ଶ ൅ 1
൲dKdT െ ሺ1 ൅ rሻ. (32) 
The second term of the right-hand-side shows the direct effect of corporate taxation 
on an interest rate, which is a negative effect on the interest rate. However, a decrease 
                                                  
8 The numerator of (31) is negative in ଵି஘஘ ൐
ሺଵା୰ሻ
஑ିଵ . The sign of 
ୢ୏౪శభ
ୢ୏౪  is negative in 
ଵି஘
஘ ൐
െ ଵ
ಉషభ
ಉ ሺଵିகሻቌଵି
భ
౗ഥమష౗∗మ
మ಍౗∗మ శభ
ቍ
. This inequality reduces to θ∗∗ ൏ θ∗. 
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in capital stock pulls up the marginal productivity of capital stock, which is shown by 
the first term on the right-hand-side. The results in θ ൏ θ∗∗ ൏ θ∗ are the same as those 
in θ∗∗ ൏ θ∗ ൏ ߠ. Then, the following proposition is established. 
 
Proposition 4 
With θ ൏ θ∗∗ ൏ θ∗ or θ∗∗ ൏ θ∗ ൏ ߠ, the redistribution policy financed by a corporate tax 
decreases the capital stock at the steady state. Then, the wage rate of skilled labor, wage 
inequality between skilled labor and unskilled labor, the share of skilled labor, and 
household disposable income inequality all decrease. The effect on the interest rate is 
ambiguous. 
 
Actually, θ ൏ θ∗∗ ൏ θ∗ shows the case with a positive sign in denominator of (31) and 
negative sign in numerator of (31). This case shows that an increase in capital stock 
brings more capital stock; the negative effect of a corporate tax reduces the capital stock. 
We regard this case as an ordinary case. However, in θ∗∗ ൏ θ∗ ൏ ߠ , the sign in the 
denominator of (31) is negative and the sign in numerator of (31) is positive, which is not 
an ordinary case. This case shows that an increase in capital stock reduces the 
investment for capital stock in the subsequent period. Then, even if the effect of a 
corporate tax on the capital stock is small and the household saving increases, this 
increase reduces the steady state capital stock because of the negative sign of (19). 
If θ
∗∗ ൏ ߠ ൏ θ∗, then both the numerator and denominator of (31) are positive. We 
can obtain ୢ୏ୢ୘ ൐ 0. Then, we can obtain the same case with the case of consumption tax 
as shown by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5 
With θ∗∗ ൏ ߠ ൏ θ∗, the capital stock in the steady state increases. Then, the wage rate of 
skilled labor, the share of skilled labor, and wage inequality between skilled labor and 
unskilled labor all increase. Household lifetime income inequality shrinks in ୢ୵ୢ୘ ൏
ଵ
௔ത ቀ
ሺ௔തା௔∗ሻ௪
஻ െ 2ቁ. The interest rate decreases. 
 
This case shows the effect of corporate tax on capital accumulation when an increase 
in capital stock raises more investment for capital accumulation, which is the ordinary 
case. 
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Our paper sets the corporate tax on profits, or revenues minus labor costs. If we 
consider the corporate tax as 
π୲ ൌ ሺ1 െ τୖሻ൫AK୲஘N୲ଵି஘ െ w୲N୲ െ ሺ1 ൅ r୲ሻK୲൯, (33) 
where the corporate tax revenue is zero because the product function has constant 
returns to scale in a perfectly competitive market. 
This corporate tax is the same with taxation for an interest rate. If taxation for 
interest income is considered, then the result is the same as those described above. 
Considering τ୰ as the capital income tax rate, (8) changes to 
1 ൅ ሺ1 െ τ୰ሻr୲ ൌ Aε ୏౪
಍షభ
୒౪಍షభ.  (34) 
Capital income taxation affects the interest rate, which has the same effect as corporate 
taxation. 
 
5. Welfare 
This section presents consideration of the welfare level. We define the social welfare 
function as the following equation: 
W୲ ൌ න c
ሺaሻଵ୲ଵି஘
1 െ θ
ୟത
଴
1
aത da ൅
1
1 ൅ ρන
cሺaሻଶ୲ାଵଵି஘
1 െ θ
ୟത
଴
1
aത da.   (35) 
Consumption levels of cሺaሻଵ୲ and cሺaሻଶ୲ାଵ are given respectively by (3) and (4). In a 
steady state, the redistribution policy financed by labor income taxation always pulls up 
the social welfare given by (35). In labor income taxation, the capital stock does not 
change and income inequality as unskilled labor and household disposable income 
decreases. Moreover, thanks to the decrease in marginal utility, the income transfer from 
the rich to the poor increases the level of social welfare. 
However, the consumption tax and corporate tax do not always increase social 
welfare. If the redistribution policy financed by the consumption tax and corporate tax 
increases the wage rate and the share of skilled labor because of an increase in capital 
stock, then the level of social welfare increases. However, an increase in capital stock 
reduces the interest rate and might decrease consumption in the old period. Therefore, 
social welfare does not always increase. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our paper presents an examination of how differences of taxation affect both income 
inequality and the income level. As a result, financing by labor income taxation can 
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always shrink income inequality. The redistribution policy with a consumption tax 
increases wage inequality. Income inequality after redistribution within the group and 
between groups might be magnified. However, the corporate tax and capital income tax 
reduce the capital stock and wage inequality in the case in which an intertemporal 
consumption is substitutive. 
Aghion (2002) shows that inequality within a group increases and that inequality 
between groups decreases as the skill premium puzzle. A technology shock is a useful 
tool to explain this skill premium puzzle. However, our paper presents derivation of the 
fact that income inequality is brought about by other reasons such as taxation. From the 
view of optimal taxation studies, our paper shows that labor income should be used for 
redistribution policies to raise social welfare, not a consumption tax or capital income 
tax.    
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Appendix 
A.1 Derivation of ܌۹ܜశ૚܌۹ܜ  
Total differentiation of (11)–(13), (17) and (18) at the steady state derives the following 
equations. 
da୲∗ ൌ െa
∗
w dw୲ (A.1) 
εw
K dK୲ ൌ ቆ1 ൅
2εa∗ଶ
aതଶ െ a∗ଶቇ dw୲ (A.2) 
dr୲ାଵ ൌ െ
ሺ1 െ εሻሺ1 ൅ rሻ
K dK୲ାଵ ൅
2a∗ሺ1 ൅ rሻሺ1 െ εሻ
aതଶ െ a∗ଶ da୲ାଵ
∗  (A.3) 
dα୲ାଵ ൌ θ െ 1θ ൬
1 ൅ ρ
1 ൅ r൰
ଵ
஘ dr୲ାଵ (A.4) 
aതαdK୲ାଵ ൌ aത
ଶ െ a∗ଶ
2 dw୲ െ aതK
θ െ 1
θ ൬
1 ൅ ρ
1 ൅ r൰
ଵ
஘ dr୲ାଵ (A.5) 
Putting (A.1)–(A.4) into (A.5), we obtain the stable condition ୢ୏౪శభୢ୏౪ . 
 
A.2 Existence of steady state equilibrium 
This appendix presents the existence of a steady state equilibrium with numerical 
examples. The steady state equilibrium is given by the following equations. 
aത ൬1 ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ρሻଵ஘ሺ1 ൅ rሻଵିଵ஘൰K ൌ aത
ଶ
2 w ൅
B
2 a
∗ (A.6) 
w ൌ Aሺ1 െ εሻ ቆaത
ଶ െ a∗ଶ
2aത ቇ
ିக
Kக (A.7) 
1 ൅ r ൌ Aε ቆaത
ଶ െ a∗ଶ
2aത ቇ
ଵିக
Kகିଵ (A.8) 
a∗ ൌ Bw (A.9) 
  We set parameters aത ൌ 1, ρ ൌ 0.1, ε ൌ 1, A ൌ 1, B ൌ 0.1  for an exemplary case. We 
obtain K=0.104854 at θ ൌ 1.5, K=0.098634 at θ ൌ 1, and K=0.088894 at θ ൌ 0.5. These 
results demonstrate the existence of the steady state equilibrium. 
 
 
 
